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Aligning Interculturalism with International Human Rights Law: ‘Living Together’ 
without Assimilation 
 
Stephanie E. Berry∗ 
 
ABSTRACT 
On the basis of the perceived failure of multiculturalism, a shift towards ‘interculturalism’ 
has been advocated by politicians in Western Europe and international organisations 
including UNESCO and the Council of Europe. While seemingly benign from a human rights 
perspective, critics of interculturalism warn that in practice this shift can be used to justify the 
adoption of assimilationist policies. Forced or unwanted assimilation violates the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities. Consequently, this article explores the compatibility of 
interculturalism with international human rights law. It argues that when adopted within a 
minority rights (multiculturalist) framework, such as the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities, interculturalism is broadly compatible with human rights 
standards. However, when adopted outside this framework, for example, within the European 
Court on Human Rights’ jurisprudence, interculturalist concepts can easily be used to 
legitimize the violation of the rights of persons belonging to minorities.  
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Multiculturalism as a method of diversity management has been increasingly problematised 
since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Critics have accused multiculturalism of 
prioritizing diversity above commonality and, in so doing, of leading to segregation and 
                                                





division.1 Consequently, a shift from multiculturalism to interculturalism has been advocated 
by politicians and within international organisations, including UNESCO and the Council of 
Europe. 2 Significantly, in 2008, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
adopted the ‘White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue: Living Together as Equals in Dignity’, 
which simultaneously pronounced that the multiculturalist experiment had failed and 
proposed ‘intercultural dialogue’ as the alternative. 3  Although terms associated with 
interculturalism, such as ‘intercultural education’, have been used within the Council of 
Europe since the 1970s,4 the White Paper signaled the evolution of interculturalism into a 
comprehensive approach to diversity management. This development has gradually been 
mirrored in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).5  
 Similarly, since the 1980s, the concept of interculturalism has been elaborated within 
academic literature, particularly in relation to ‘intercultural education’.6 However, it is only 
recently, through the work of Bouchard and Cantle that an attempt has been made to 
formulate interculturalism as a coherent alternative to multiculturalism for liberal democratic 
States.7 Multiculturalists have argued that the shift from multiculturalism to interculturalism 
simply represents a change in narrative8 or rhetoric.9  However, Taylor has conceded that the 
reported shift also denotes a change in emphasis from ‘multi’ or diversity to ‘inter’, in 
particular, integration.10   
                                                
1 See, for example, Joppke, ‘The Retreat of Multiculturalism and the Liberal State: Theory and Policy’ 
(2004) 55 The British Journal of Sociology 237 at 243; Cantle, Interculturalism – The New Era of Cohesion 
and Diversity (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) at 53-90. 
2  Kymlicka, ‘Comment on Meer and Modood’ (2012) 33 Journal of Intercultural Studies 211 at 213. 
3  Council of Europe, White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue “Living Together as Equals in Dignity” 
(Council of Europe Publishing, 2008) at 9. 
4  Bunjes, ‘The Intercultural Milestone: The History of the Council of Europe’s “White Paper on Intercultural 
Dialogue”’ in Barrett (ed), Interculturalism and Multiculturalism: Similarities and Differences (Council of 
Europe Publishing, 2013) 43 at 43; Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Council for Cultural 
Cooperation, 42nd Session (10th meeting as a Steering Commitee) Delphi (Greece), 1-4 June 1982, 
Meeting Report, CM(82) 137/CDCC (82) 35/ at 22, 36. 
5  SAS v France Application No 43835/11, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 1 July 2014; Dogru v France 
Application No 27058/05, Merits, 4 December 2008, at para 62.  
6  See for example, Albert and Triandis, ‘Intercultural Education for Multicultural Societies: Critical Issues’ 
(1985) 9 International Journal of Intercultural Relations 319; Fennes and Hapgood, Intercultural Learning 
in the Classroom: Crossing Borders (Cassell, 1997); Salvadori, ‘The Difficulties of Interculturalism’ 
(1997) 8 European Journal of Intercultural Studies 185.  
7  Bouchard and Taylor, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation Report (2008), available at 
https://www.mce.gouv.qc.ca/publications/CCPARDC/rapport-final-integral-en.pdf [last accessed 16 May 
2017]; Bouchard, ‘What is Interculturalism?’ (2011) 56 McGill Law Journal 435; Cantle, supra n 1; Cantle, 
‘National Identity, Plurality and Interculturalism’ (2014) 85 The Political Quarterly 312.  
8  Kymlicka, supra n 2 at 213. 
9  Taylor, ‘Interculturalism or Multiculturalism’ (2012) 38 Philosophy and Social Criticism 413 at 416. 




 Whilst multiculturalism has been broadly accepted to align with the pursuit of 
international human rights standards,11 it is now important to examine the compatibility of 
interculturalism with international human rights law. Concepts associated with 
interculturalism such as ‘integration’ and ‘societal cohesion’ have been the focus of academic 
discussion in the field of international human rights law.12 The original contribution made by 
this article lies in its exploration of the implications of the adoption of interculturalism as a 
comprehensive approach to diversity management for the protection of the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities in Europe. Specifically, this article examines the extent to which the 
core components of interculturalism align with international human rights standards and have 
been furthered, in practice, by human rights institutions.  
 This article draws on the body of interculturalist literature; however, particular 
emphasis is placed on the work of Bouchard and Cantle, the main proponents of a coherent 
vision of interculturalism. It is argued that while the shift from multiculturalism to 
interculturalism appears to be benign from a human rights perspective, terms and concepts 
associated with interculturalism have the potential to take on assimilationist interpretations. 
Forced or involuntary assimilation violates the human rights of persons belonging to 
minorities.13 Thus, if interculturalism is to be consistent with international human rights law, 
it must be adopted within a framework that recognizes the vulnerability of persons belonging 
to minorities to human rights violations. Consequently, interculturalism must be allied with a 
minority rights (multiculturalist) framework rather than being understood as an entirely 
separate method of diversity management. 
 This article, first, introduces interculturalist theory before exploring its compatibility 
with international human rights standards. This reveals the potential for interculturalism to be 
conflated with assimilation in violation of international minority rights standards. Second, it 
                                                
11  McGoldrick, ‘Multiculturalism and its Discontents’ (2005) 5 Human Rights Law Review 27 at 35; 
Xanthaki, ‘Multiculturalism and International Law: Discussing Universal Standards’ (2010) 32 Human 
Rights Quarterly 21 at 22-3. 
12 Medda-Windischer, Old and New Minorities: Reconciling Diversity and Cohesion – A Human Rights 
Model for Minority Integration (Nomos, 2009); Henrard, ‘Tracing Visions of Integration and/or Minorities: 
An Analysis of the Supervisory Practice of the FCNM (2011) 13 International Community Law Review 
333; Berry ‘“New” Minorities, Integration Policies and the UN Declaration on Minorities’ in Caruso and 
Hofmann (eds), The United Nations Declaration on Minorities: An Academic Account on the Occasion of 
its 20th Anniversary (Brill, 2015) 192; Xanthaki, ‘Against Integration, For Human Rights’ (2016) 20 
International Journal of Human Rights 815. 
13  UN Commission on Human Rights, ‘Commentary of the Working Group on Minorities to the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities’, 4 April 2005, E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2005/2 at para 2; Council of Europe, Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and Explanatory Report, H(1995)010 at para 5; 




examines the interpretation of interculturalist concepts by human rights bodies within the 
Council of Europe. The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
(FCNM)14 provides an example of the adoption of interculturalism within a minority rights 
(multiculturalist) framework, whereas the freedom of religion or belief jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR provides an example of the adoption of interculturalism outside this framework. This 
examination reveals the extent to which interculturalist concepts take on assimilationist 
connotations when adopted outside a minority rights framework. The Advisory Committee to 
the FCNM (AC-FCNM) does not conflate interculturalism with assimilation and, in practice, 
has remedied some of the failings of interculturalism in this respect. In contrast, terms 
associated with interculturalism have been (mis)appropriated by States to legitimize 
assimilationist policies in the ECtHR. This not only undermines the human rights of persons 
belonging to minorities but also the pursuit of the interculturalist vision.  
 
2. THE IMPACT OF THE SHIFT FROM MULTICULTURALISM TO 
INTERCULTURALISM ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Multiculturalism has long been thought to align with the aims and values of the international 
human rights regime. While it is not a consistent and coherent policy,15 multiculturalism 
pursues similar aims to the minority rights regime, by recognizing the right of non-dominant 
groups to preserve, practice and protect their cultures. 16  Consequently, Xanthaki has 
proposed that ‘current human rights law endorses the components of multicultural policies 
and reflects a multicultural vision’. 17  However, multiculturalism has been blamed for 
segregation,18 riots,19 terrorism20 and the alleged failure of European Muslims to integrate.21 
As a result, Levey notes: 
 
                                                
14  Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities ETS No 157, entered into force 1 
February 1998. 
15  Murphy, Multiculturalism: A Critical Introduction (Routledge, 2012) at 6. 
16  Article 27 ICCPR. 
17  Xanthaki, supra n 11 at 22-3.  
18 Joppke, supra n 1; Cantle, supra n 1. 
19  Cantle, Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team (Home Office, 2001) available at: 
tedcantle.co.uk/pdf/communitycohesion%20cantlereport.pdf [last accessed 29 March 2018] at para 2.1. 
20  Abbas, ‘Muslim Minorities in Britain: Integration, Multiculturalism and Radicalism in the Post-7/7 Period’ 
(2007) 28 Journal of Intercultural Studies 287 at 288; Vertovec, ‘Towards Post-Multiculturalism? 
Changing Communities, Conditions and Contexts of Diversity’ (2010) 61 International Social Science 
Journal 83 at 90. 




[I]n Europe, in the wake of militant Islam and the moral panic over Muslim 
immigration and integration, interculturalism or “intercultural dialogue” is being 
advocated as an alternative to multiculturalism, offering a more acceptable set of 
principles and arrangements for the state management of cultural diversity. 22  
 
The shift from multiculturalism to interculturalism has, notably, been endorsed by 
international organisations with a human rights mandate including the Council of Europe and 
UNESCO.23 This section, first, introduces the main approaches within interculturalist theory. 
Second, it explores the compatibility of interculturalism with the international human rights 
regime. It is argued that although interculturalism, for the most part, aligns with international 
human rights law, specific elements of the two main interculturalist theories have the 
potential to be interpreted to support measures of assimilation, contrary to international 
minority rights standards. 
 
A. Introducing Interculturalism 
 
Interculturalism, much like multiculturalism, is a contested term and multiple interpretations 
of the concept exist. Nonetheless, Cantle suggests ‘there would appear to be some acceptance 
that its key features are a sense of openness, dialogue and interaction’. 24  Like 
multiculturalists, interculturalists see diversity as an asset that should be preserved,25 and 
expressly oppose measures of assimilation.26 From a European perspective, the Council of 
Europe’s White Paper explains that intercultural dialogue has learnt from past attempts at 
diversity management and, thus, ‘takes from assimilation the focus on the individual; it takes 
from multiculturalism the recognition of cultural diversity. And it adds the new element, 
critical to integration and social cohesion, of dialogue on the basis of equal dignity and 
                                                
22  Levey, ‘Interculturalism vs. Multiculturalism: A Distinction without a Difference?’ (2012) 33 Journal of 
Intercultural Studies 217 at 218. 
23  Council of Europe, supra n 3 at 19; UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity 
of Cultural Expressions, adopted 20 Oct. 2005, 33d Sess., UNESCO Doc. CLT/CEI/DCE/2007/PI/32 
(2005) (entered into force 18 March 2007). 
24  Cantle, ‘Interculturalism as a New Narrative for the Era of Globalisation and Super-Diversity’ in Barrett 
(ed), supra n 4, 69 at 78. 
25  Meer, Modood and Zapata-Barerro, ‘A Plural Century: Situating Interculturalism and Multiculturalism’ in 
Meer, Modood and Zapata-Barrero (eds), Multiculturalism and Interculturalism - Debating the Dividing 
Lines (Edinburgh University Press, 2016) 1 at 9; Bouchard, ‘Interculturalism: What Makes it Distinctive?’ 
in Barrett (ed), supra n 4, 93 at 95. 
26  Taylor, ‘Foreword’ in Meer, Modood and Zapata-Barrero (eds), supra n 25, vii at vii; Meer, Modood and 




shared values’.27 Consequently, although interculturalism attempts to respond to critiques of 
multiculturalism, there is significant overlap between interculturalist and multiculturalist 
policies. 28 Nonetheless, in practice the points of departure of the two approaches are 
different. Multiculturalism focuses on cultural rights ‘and thus has an initial understanding of 
interpersonal comparisons that is centered in what is different’.29 In contrast, interculturalism 
is ‘a strategy to manage a dynamic process of interaction based in what is common’. 30  
 Drawing on the dominant schools of thought, Zapata-Barrero has identified three 
different strands of interculturalist thought: the contractual, cohesion and constructivist 
strands.31 The contractual strand focuses on the vertical relationship between individuals, in 
particular immigrants, and ‘the basic structures of society’ with the aim of ‘enhancing 
stability in a diverse society’. 32 Bouchard describes interculturalism as ‘a search for balance 
and mediation between often-competing principles, values and expectations’.33 This approach 
focuses on balancing the interests of the majority, not least the preservation of national 
identity, with the protection of the rights of minorities.34 The presence of the majority’s 
culture in State institutions and broader society is valid.35  Minorities should ‘adapt to their 
host society, adhere to its basic values and respect its institutions’.36 However, the reasonable 
accommodation of minority practices is also necessary to prevent discrimination, facilitate 
integration and defuse tensions.37 Notably, this strand of interculturalism was originally 
developed in the context of Quebec;38 however, Bouchard has asserted that it is of broader 
relevance to the West.39 While this interpretation of interculturalism has been criticized by 
Cantle for being ‘a progressive variant of multiculturalism’, 40  it is distinct from 
                                                
27  Council of Europe, supra n 3 at 19. 
28  Cantle, supra n 1 at 142; Barrett, ‘Introduction - Interculturalism and Multiculturalism: Concepts and 
Controversies’ in Barrett (ed), supra n 4, 15 at 26; Cantle, supra n 24 at 84. 
29  Zapata-Barrero, ‘Exploring the Foundations of the Intercultural Policy Paradigm: A Comprehensive 
Approach (2016) 23 Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 155 at 157. 
30  Ibid.  
31  Ibid., see generally. 
32  Ibid., at 160; Zapata-Barrero, ‘Theorising Intercultural Citizenship’ in Meer, Modood and Zapata-Barrero 
(eds), supra n 25, 53 at 67. 
33  Bouchard, supra n 7 at 461. 
34  Zapata-Barrero, supra n 29 at 162.  
35  Bouchard, supra n 7 at 458. 
36  Ibid. 
37  Ibid. 
38  Ibid., at 454. 
39  Ibid., at 445, 468. 
40  Cantle, supra n 1 at 141. See also, Iacovino, ‘Commentary: ‘Interculturalism vs Multiculturalism - How 
Can We Live Together in Diversity’ in Antonsich (ed), ‘Interculturalism versus Multiculturalism - The 




multiculturalism insofar as it supports the granting of ad hoc precedence to the majority or 
‘foundational culture’.41  
 The cohesion strand is based on Allport’s contact theory, which emphasizes the role 
that positive interactions between citizens play in the creation of societal cohesion and 
prejudice reduction.42 Such interactions, Loobuyk explains, seek ‘to break down prejudices, 
stereotypes and misconceptions of others, and to generate mutual understanding, reciprocal 
identification, societal trust and solidarity’. 43 Unlike the contractual strand, the cohesion 
strand is not concerned with the perpetuation and preservation of minority or majority 
cultures, as both are understood to be in a constant state of flux.44 Instead, the cohesion strand 
requires the creation of spaces and opportunities for intercultural interactions to take place,45 
the provision of intercultural education,46 as well as the removal of barriers to successful 
interactions. 47 Although developed in the context of the United Kingdom, Cantle has 
highlighted the cohesion strand’s relevance to Europe more generally.48 Significantly, this 
approach aligns most closely with the interpretation of interculturalism adopted in the 
Council of Europe’s White Paper, which emphasizes the importance of democratic 
citizenship and participation, intercultural competence and intercultural spaces.49 Finally, the 
constructivist strand views diversity as an asset that should be utilized in order to promote 
development.50 In practice, ‘[t]his means redesigning institutions and policies in all fields to 
treat diversity as a potential resource and a public good, and not as a nuisance to be 
contained’. 51  This strand of interculturalism remains relatively underdeveloped in the 
literature and, therefore, is not the focus of this article.  
                                                
41  Bouchard, supra n 7 at 445, 468; Modood, ‘Multiculturalism, Interculturalisms and the Majority’ (2014) 43 
Journal of Moral Education 302 at 309.  
42  See generally, Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Addison-Wesley, 1954). See, further, Cantle, supra n 24 at 
80; Zapata-Barrero, supra n 29 at 160. 
43  Loobuyk, ‘Towards an Intercultural Sense of Belonging Together: Reflections on the Theoretical and 
Political Level’ in Meer, Modood and Zapata-Barrero (eds), supra n 25, 225 at 230. 
44  Cantle, supra n 24 at 83. 
45  Ibid., at 79. 
46  Bekemans, ‘Educational Challenges and Perspectives in Multiculturalism vs. Interculturalism: Citizenship 
Education for Intercultural Realities’ in Barrett (ed), supra n 4, 169 at 177. 
47  Barrett, ‘Intercultural Competence: A Distinctive Hallmark of Interculturalisn?’ in Barrett (ed), supra n 4, 
147 at 157. 
48  See generally, Cantle, ‘The Case for Interculturalism, Plural Identities and Cohesion’ in Meer, Modood and 
Zapata-Barrero (eds), supra n 25, 133. 
49  Council of Europe, supra n 3 at 28-33; Levey, ‘Diversity, Duality and Time’ in Meer, Modood and Zapata-
Barrero (eds), supra n 25, 201 at 205. 
50  Zapata-Barrero, supra n 29 at 163.  




 Both the contractual and cohesion strands of interculturalism recognize the 
importance of intercultural interactions.52 However, Bouchard’s interculturalism prioritizes 
the perpetuation of the identity of the majority, whereas, the cohesion strand emphasizes the 
plural and fluid nature of identity. This distinction can be attributed to the nationalist and 
cosmopolitan foci of the respective strands of interculturalism.53 Nonetheless, significant 
commonalities and intersections can be identified across the strands. The ‘search for balance’ 
advocated by Bouchard is dependent upon dialogue between citizens, a key element of the 
cohesion strand.54 The conditions for the cohesion strand are not only dependent upon 
‘intercultural competence’ but also State policies to combat structural and institutional 
barriers to intercultural dialogue (the contractual strand). All three strands of interculturalism 
intersect and reinforce one another and, therefore, as recognized by Zapata-Barrero, there is a 
need to ‘to balance them in a comprehensive framework’55 if the interculturalist project is to 
achieve its aim of facilitating the creation of cohesive societies. Consequently, despite the 
identified internal inconsistencies, this article draws upon interculturalism as a whole, with a 
particular emphasis on the contractual and cohesion strands.  
 
B. Interculturalism and the International Human Rights Regime 
 
This section turns to the compatibility of interculturalism with international human rights 
law. Despite the apparent common aims of international human rights law and multicultural 
policies, in practice, the language of multiculturalism has not been adopted or endorsed in 
international and regional human rights instruments. In contrast, interculturalist concepts 
have a long history in the Council of Europe, in particular, ‘intercultural education’ and 
‘intercultural dialogue’.56 However, the Council of Europe, along with UNESCO, only 
recently sought to develop interculturalism and intercultural dialogue as an alternative to 
multiculturalism. 57  Notably, the language of interculturalism has been adopted in the 
                                                
52  Bouchard, supra n 7 at 448; Cantle, supra n 48 at 154-5. 
53  Parekh, ‘Afterword: Multiculturalism and Interculturalism - A Critical Dialogue’ in Meer, Modood and 
Zapata-Barrero (eds), supra n 25, 266 at 276. 
54  Bouchard, supra n 25 at 97. 
55  Zapata-Barrero, supra n 29 at 167.  
56  Bunjes, supra n 4 at 43. Council of Europe, supra n 3 at 22, 36 
57  Kymlicka, supra n 2 at 213; Loobuyk, supra n 43 at 225; Kymlicka, ‘Defending Diversity in an Era of 
Populism: Multiculturalism and Interculturalism Compared’ in Meer, Modood and Zapata-Barrero (eds), 




FCNM,58 by the ECtHR59 and in the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. Furthermore, the ECtHR’s dicta 
‘pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness are hallmarks of a “democratic society”’,60 has 
been interpreted by scholars to embody multiculturalism.61 However, it can equally be argued 
to align with interculturalism, insofar as interculturalism promotes ‘the pluralist 
transformation of public space, institutions and civic culture’,62 whilst recognizing the need 
to develop the ‘cultural navigational skills’ of citizens.63  
 At a fundamental level, interculturalists and international human rights standards have 
affirmed that measures to encourage the integration of persons belonging to minorities are 
legitimate.64 In contrast, forced or unwanted assimilation have been expressly recognized to 
violate the rights of persons belonging to minorities.65 While assimilation is a one-way 
process of adaptation by the minority,66 integration is a two-way process, within which both 
the minority and broader society make concessions in order to adjust to increasing diversity.67 
Raz suggests that any demand for assimilation ‘is liable to undermine people’s dignity and 
self-respect ... It shows that the state, their state, has no respect for their culture, finds it 
inferior and plots its elimination’.68 Consequently, forced or unwanted assimilation have the 
potential to increase the insecurity of persons belonging to minorities and undermine the 
primary aim of interculturalism, societal cohesion. 
 The pursuit of interculturalism has not only been endorsed within the international 
human rights framework, it has also been formulated as a State obligation. The 2005 
UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
                                                
58  Article 6(1) FCNM. 
59  SAS, supra n 5.  
60  See, for example, Leyla Şahin v Turkey Application No 44774/98, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 10 
November 2005 at para 108; SAS, supra n 5 at para 128. 
61  McGoldrick, supra n 11 at 35. 
62  Bloomfield and Bianchini, Planning for the Intercultural City (Comedia, 2004) cited in Cantle, supra n 1 at 
156. 
63  Cantle, supra n 7 at 312; Zapata-Barrero, supra n 32 at 65; Barrett, supra n 28 at 26.  
64  Article 5(2) FCNM; UN Commission on Human Rights, supra n 13 at para 21; OSCE, The Ljubljana 
Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies & Explanatory Note (2012); Bouchard, ‘Quebec 
Interculturalism and Canadian Multiculturalism’ in Meer, Modood and Zapata-Barrero (eds), supra n 25 at 
78; Cantle, supra n 24, 77 at 84. 
65  UN Commission on Human Rights, supra n 13 at paras 21-23; Council of Europe, supra n 13 at para 45; 
article 8(1) UNDRIP; Taylor, supra n 26 at vii; Wilson, ‘The Urgency of Intercultural Dialogue in Europe 
of Insecurity’ in Barrett (ed), supra n 4, 53 at 62; Zapata-Barerro, supra n 32 at 54. 
66  In the American context, there have been attempts to reconceptualize assimilation as a two-way process, 
however, within Europe, the focus of this article, it is still understood to denote a one-way process. See 
further, Alba and Nee, ‘Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration’ (1997) 31 The 
International Migration Review 826.  
67  Modood, Multiculturalism – A Civic Idea, 2nd edn (Polity Press, 2013) at 44. 




Expressions aims to facilitate ‘wider and balanced cultural exchanges in the world in favour 
of intercultural respect and a culture of peace’ and ‘to foster interculturality’.69 Article 4 
defines ‘interculturality’ as ‘the existence and equitable interaction of diverse cultures and the 
possibility of generating shared cultural expressions through dialogue and mutual respect’.70 
Similarly, Ringelheim has suggested that article 6(1) FCNM, which promotes intercultural 
dialogue, endeavours to 
 
bring the FCNM beyond a mere ideal of peaceful coexistence of majority and 
minorities ... [it] is not only about enabling minority members to maintain their 
distinctiveness. It is also geared towards ensuring their inclusion and participation 
on an equal footing in the society at large, as well as promoting interactions, 
exchanges and intermingling between people across ethnic, cultural, linguistic 
and religious lines.71 
 
The UNESCO and FCNM understandings of interculturality and intercultural dialogue focus 
on cultural exchange and interactions and, thus, align with the cohesion strand of 
interculturalism.72 However, the purpose of article 6(1) FCNM is also similar to Bouchard’s 
vision of interculturalism as ‘a sustained effort aimed at connecting majorities and 
minorities’.73 Therefore, both the contractual and cohesion strands of interculturalism find 
expression within international human rights instruments. 
 Although the term interculturalism is not utilized in the International Bill of Rights, 
UN treaty bodies and interculturalists have adopted similar definitions of culture. 
Specifically, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has 
recognized that culture is ‘a living process, historical, dynamic and evolving, with a past, a 
present and a future’.74 Interculturalists recognize that culture is a ‘dynamic process’75 that is 
‘constantly evolving and changing’. 76  Furthermore, both Cantle and CESCR have 
                                                
69  Article 1 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.  
70  Notably, the 2005 UNESCO Convention was not intended to provide a model of diversity management for 
multicultural societies. 
71  Ringelheim, ‘Minority Rights in a Time of Multiculturalism—The Evolving Scope of the Framework 
Convention on the Protection of National Minorities’ (2010) 10 Human Rights Law Review 99 at 118. 
72  Cantle, supra n 1 at 155. 
73  Bouchard, supra n 7 at 461.  
74  Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 21: Article 15(1)(a) The Right 
of Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life, 21 December 2009, E/C.12/GC/21 at para 11. 
75  Cantle, supra n 1 at 143.  




acknowledged that individuals have plural, intersecting and increasingly cosmopolitan 
identities.77  
 On the basis of this understanding of culture, interculturalists have criticized 
multiculturalist approaches to diversity management; policies that seek to preserve minority 
cultures risk essentialization, 78  ‘putting people into boxes’ 79  and legitimizing illiberal 
practices.80 Although this suggests that interculturalists have rejected targeted minority rights 
standards, the drafters of international minority rights instruments and the AC-FCNM have 
addressed these criticisms. Both the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities81 and the FCNM refer to ‘persons 
belonging to minorities’ rather than minorities qua minorities and, thus, prioritize the human 
rights of individuals above the protection of the group. The individualised nature of minority 
rights protection is also demonstrated by the right to self-identify, article 3 FCNM, which 
‘extends to multiple affiliations’.82 This closely aligns with interculturalism, which ‘is about 
first asking how people recognize their identities, and it then respects their self-
identification’.83 The AC-FCNM has also attempted to avoid the essentialization of minority 
identities by insisting that States avoid privileging one minority representative association to 
the disadvantage of others 84  as ‘such differential treatment between organisations of 
minorities is not conducive to pluralism and internal democracy within minorities’.85 Finally, 
the interculturalist concern that the protection of culture may legitimize and perpetuate 
illiberal minority practices has also been addressed within minority rights standards and by 
                                                
77  Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra n 74 at para 12; Cantle, supra n 1 at 211. 
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their monitoring bodies. Minority rights protection is subject to the requirement that practices 
conform with international human rights law.86 
 Interculturalism and international human rights law appear to have adopted a similar 
approach to culture and the challenges posed by diversity. Yet, interculturalism remains 
problematic from an international human rights perspective. Despite the different rationales 
underpinning the two instruments, the primary aims of the FCNM and the 2005 UNESCO 
Convention are the maintenance of diversity and the promotion and protection of different 
cultures. Thus, multiculturalist and interculturalist visions have been combined in these 
instruments. This is not problematic per se; multiculturalists and interculturalists have 
suggested that it is possible to reconcile the two approaches.87 However, questions over the 
compatibility of interculturalism with international human rights standards arise when 
interculturalism is implemented outside a multiculturalist framework. Specifically, although 
interculturalists have expressly opposed assimilation,88 two elements of interculturalism have 
distinctly assimilationist connotations: Bouchard’s recognition of the ad hoc precedence of 
the ‘foundational culture’89 and Cantle’s insistence that interculturalism requires ‘an end to 
the privileges of financial and representational benefits enjoyed by people of supposedly 
single identities’. 90   
 Bouchard’s concept of ad hoc precedence acknowledges that the majority may feel 
threatened by the presence of minority cultures, ‘not only in terms of its rights, but also in 
terms of its values, traditions, language, memory, and identity (not to mention its security)’.91 
Consequently, it is legitimate for the culture of the majority, as the symbolic foundation of 
society, to be afforded precedence.92 Rather than sidelining the majority culture in order to 
protect and promote minority cultures, interculturalism seeks to balance the concerns of the 
majority with those of minorities, in order to create a cohesive society. Thus, ad hoc 
precedence appears to align with the ECtHR’s margin of appreciation, insofar as it allows 
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States discretion to reconcile the competing interests of different groups in society.93 
However, it is significant that the UN Human Rights Committee and the AC-FCNM do not 
permit States the same discretion.94  
Ad hoc precedence can be defended on the basis that it simply recognizes the inherent 
bias that all liberal States display in favour of the culture of the majority.95 Yet, by 
institutionalizing this bias, the award of ad hoc precedence risks further privileging the 
culture of the majority. The prioritization of the ‘foundational culture’ has the potential to 
place the onus of adaptation on persons belonging to minorities and, thus, may inadvertently 
lead integration to be construed as a one-way process. Bouchard has recognized that ad hoc 
precedence must be carefully circumscribed to avoid the abuse of the dominant position.96 In 
particular, he acknowledges the need for ad hoc precedence to be balanced with minority 
rights and reasonable accommodations.97 Nonetheless, there is still potential for the abuse of 
the dominant position to result in the unwanted assimilation of minorities within this model 
of interculturalism. Indeed, Bouchard has acknowledged that ‘during the recent controversies 
in Europe, it sometimes came to acquire this kind of connotation’.98 Similarly, critics of the 
ECtHR’s margin of appreciation have noted that deference to democratic States risks 
subjecting minorities to the tyranny of the majority.99  
In contrast, Cantle does not support the prioritization of the majority culture, as 
identities, including the national identity, are not static. 100  Instead, he promotes the 
‘[w]ithdrawal of state support for promotion of particular cultural and religious identities’,101 
in order to ‘avoid privileging one over the other’.102 This element of Cantle’s theory is 
underpinned by a concern that State support has the potential to reify single identities.103 
Nonetheless, much like ad hoc precedence, the withdrawal of State support for minority 
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identities has the potential to lead interculturalist policies to become blurred with 
assimilationist policies and result in de jure rather than de facto equal treatment between 
majority and minority cultures.  
As noted by Xanthaki, ‘[t]he neutral state does not promote justice; rather it maintains 
the status quo. Members of minority cultural groups do not have the same opportunities to 
live and work in their culture and make their own choices to the same degree as the members 
of majority cultures’.104 Cantle’s interculturalism risks reinforcing structural inequalities by 
failing to recognize the inherent bias of the liberal, democratic State in favour of the culture 
of the majority. This bias is not problematic per se but minority rights and multiculturalists 
recognize that additional measures are required to enable minorities to resist involuntary 
assimilation.105 Measures of accommodation are not the privileges that Cantle suggests, but 
instead seek to place minority cultures on a par with the majority culture.106 The withdrawal 
of State support to assist the preservation of minority identities, as advocated by Cantle, 
violates minority rights standards, which establish that States have positive obligations in this 
respect.107 Notably, there is a divergence within the interculturalist camp in relation to 
reasonable accommodation, as both Barrett and Bouchard have accepted the legitimacy of 
such measures. 108  
While professing to support the integration of diverse societies and rejecting 
assimilation,109 the forms of interculturalism advocated by both Bouchard and Cantle have 
assimilationist implications. Measures taken in pursuit of interculturalism that result in the 
unwanted assimilation of minorities violate international human rights law and are likely to 
be counterproductive and undermine integration and societal cohesion.110 Nonetheless, it is 
possible for the reported shift from multiculturalism towards interculturalism to be 
compatible with international human rights standards, if interculturalist policies sufficiently 
counter the bias that liberal societies display in favour of the culture of the majority.  
 
3. INTERCULTURALISM WITHIN/OUTSIDE A MULTICULTURALIST 
FRAMEWORK 
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The Council of Europe has been one of the primary proponents of the shift from 
multiculturalism to interculturalism. The role that interculturalism can play in integrating 
diverse societies has been recognized in the Council of Europe’s White Paper on Intercultural 
Dialogue and article 6(1) FCNM. However, the above exposition has revealed that 
interculturalism has the potential to take on assimilationist interpretations and violate the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities. Interculturalists do not support assimilation and 
assimilationist policies are recognized to undermine societal cohesion, the primary goal of 
interculturalism.111  
 This section examines the interpretation of terms associated with interculturalism by 
human rights bodies, in order to test the hypothesis that interculturalism risks being conflated 
with assimilation if adopted outside a framework that recognizes the vulnerability of 
minorities to human rights abuses. The Council of Europe provides a particularly appropriate 
case study as it provides examples of the pursuit of interculturalism within a framework that 
recognizes the specific vulnerabilities of minorities (FCNM) and outside such a framework 
(European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)112 ). This section argues that while 
‘intercultural dialogue’ has been interpreted by the AC-FCNM in a manner that broadly 
aligns with interculturalism, the ECtHR has allowed concepts and terms associated with 
interculturalism to be interpreted in a way that legitimizes assimilationist policies. 
 Before proceeding, it is important to acknowledge that the two bodies explored in this 
section have different mandates and that this inevitably impacts the way they approach the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities.113  The AC-FCNM is tasked with monitoring a 
minority rights instrument and, therefore, is particularly cognisant of the vulnerability of 
persons belonging to minorities to human rights abuses, including forced or unwanted 
assimilation. Furthermore, the AC-FCNM reviews the general situation prevailing in a State 
through a State reporting procedure, with the aim of progressively improving the protection 
of rights.114 In contrast, the ECtHR does not have a minority rights mandate, as the ECHR 
does not contain a minority rights provision and attempts to adopt a minority rights protocol 
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have proven unsuccessful.115 Therefore, the ECtHR is not necessarily conscious of the 
potential for assimilationist measures to undermine the rights and dignity of persons 
belonging to minorities.116 As the ECtHR can only hear individual complaints, its role is to 
identify the borderline at which individual human rights violations occur rather than the 
general impact of a law or policy on a community.117 These differences influence the ability 
of the AC-FCNM and ECtHR to critically engage with State integration policies. 
Nonetheless, a review of their practice is valuable, as it reveals that the context in which 
interculturalist concepts are adopted has the potential to influence their interpretation.  
 
A. Interculturalism within a Multicultural Framework - The Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities 
 
The FCNM undeniably pursues a multiculturalist vision by seeking to preserve the distinct 
identity of persons belonging to national minorities. However, like interculturalists, the 
FCNM recognizes that it is legitimate for States to seek to integrate minorities, provided that 
policies or practices do not pursue assimilation.118 Rather than just seeking to preserve 
cultural differences, the FCNM also aims to create cohesive societies, through ‘intercultural 
dialogue’ contained in article 6(1) FCNM: 
 
The Parties shall encourage a spirit of tolerance and intercultural dialogue and 
take effective measures to promote mutual respect and understanding and co-
operation among all persons living on their territory, irrespective of those 
persons’ ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity, in particular in the fields 
of education, culture and the media.  
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Barrett notes ‘intercultural dialogue is arguably the central feature of interculturalism’.119 As 
multiculturalist and interculturalist visions are combined within the FCNM, it is instructive to 
consider the extent to which the interpretation of article 6(1) FCNM by the AC-FCNM aligns 
with the requirements of interculturalism and whether it has taken on assimilationist 
connotations.  
 Within the contractual strand of interculturalism, Bouchard has recognized that 
minority identities are disadvantaged within the nation-State and that reasonable 
accommodations are required to counter this disadvantage.120 Additionally, Zapata-Barrero 
has accepted that multiculturalism and interculturalism are complementary, rather than 
separate projects.121 Consequently, it can be deduced that the presence of a provision that 
pursues interculturalism within a multiculturalist treaty is not prima facie problematic from 
an interculturalist perspective. However, as previously explored, Cantle does not support 
differentiated rights for persons belonging to minorities and, in particular, has opposed State 
support for the preservation of minority identity.122 The focus here, article 6(1) FCNM, 
applies to ‘all persons living on their [the State’s] territory’ and, as a result, does not provide 
differentiated rights for persons belonging to minorities. While this suggests that article 6(1) 
FCNM could be interpreted compatibly with Cantle’s interculturalism, in practice, the AC-
FCNM has often linked this provision with article 5(1) FCNM, which requires that States 
adopt measures to enable ‘persons belonging to national minorities to maintain and develop 
their culture, and to preserve the essential elements of their identity’. Henrard suggests that 
this is because ‘the promotion of the minority identity can also enhance mutual understanding 
and interaction, and thus integration’.123 Conversely, the AC-FCNM has expressly recognized 
that ‘the promotion of tolerance and openness towards diversity’ pursues societal cohesion 
and allows persons belonging to national minorities ‘to proactively claim the rights contained 
in the Framework Convention’. 124  Thus, within the FCNM, the multiculturalist and 
interculturalist approaches to diversity management are complementary and mutually 
reinforcing. It is not possible for article 6(1) FCNM to be interpreted in a manner that is 
entirely compatible with Cantle’s interculturalism. However, this section reveals that, for the 
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most part, interculturalists and the AC-FCNM have adopted analogous interpretations of the 
requirements of successful intercultural dialogue.  
 The AC-FCNM’s Explanatory Report establishes that article 6(1) FCNM seeks: 
 
to strengthen social cohesion ... by eliminating barriers between persons 
belonging to ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious groups through the 
encouragement of intercultural organisations and movements which seek to 
promote mutual respect and understanding and to integrate these persons into 
society whilst preserving their identity.125  
 
Similarly, interculturalists view intercultural dialogue as a means to an end – societal 
cohesion – rather than an end in itself.126 The purpose of article 6(1) FCNM aligns closely 
with the cohesion strand of interculturalism, a model that seeks to create cohesive societies 
through dialogue, interactions and inclusive participation in the public life of the State.127  
 Integration is central to the interculturalist vision of cohesive societies. While 
integration is often interpreted to mean assimilation,128 both interculturalists and the AC-
FCNM have recognized that, in order to be successful, integration must be interpreted as a 
two-way process of mutual adaptation, ‘that confers a joint responsibility to the majority and 
the minorities’.129 In practice, however, the Opinions of the AC-FCNM have focused on the 
adaptation of the majority, and have ignored the steps needed to facilitate the adaptation of 
minorities.130 This can be attributed to the focus of the FCNM on the rights of persons 
belonging to national minorities rather than the rights of majorities,131 and the concern that 
integration policies often place a disproportionate emphasis on the adaptation of 
minorities.132 Nonetheless, in its Fourth Thematic Commentary the AC-FCNM emphasized 
that,  
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it is essential that all segments of society, majorities and minorities alike, are 
addressed in order for integration strategies to effectively facilitate the formation 
of societal structures where diversity and respect for difference are acknowledged 
and encouraged as normal.133  
 
Thus, a divergence between interculturalism and the AC-FCNM is unlikely to arise in this 
context.  
 Intercultural interactions and exchanges in everyday life are a central component of 
the cohesion strand of interculturalism and article 6(1) FCNM. From an interculturalist 
perspective, such exchanges facilitate integration by creating mutual trust,134 and a sense of 
solidarity, 135 and by allowing stereotypes to be countered.136 In turn, intercultural interactions 
improve integration by allowing a ‘common humanity to emerge’.137 This understanding 
aligns with the approach advocated by the AC-FCNM, in relation to the Netherlands: ‘it is 
essential to create opportunities for interethnic dialogue in all spheres of life’ and ‘concerted 
efforts must be made to develop stronger relations between the different minority groups and 
the majority population and mutual understanding within society as a whole’. 138  The 
interculturalist vision and the AC-FCNM’s interpretation of the requirements of article 6(1) 
FCNM are largely consistent. However, while the AC-FCNM and interculturalists have 
emphasized that the authorities must create opportunities for intercultural interactions to take 
place, 139  interculturalists have additionally highlighted the corresponding role of civil 
society.140  
 Interculturalists have recognized that intercultural dialogue is unlikely to facilitate 
societal cohesion if those participating do not have ‘intercultural competence’141 or ‘cultural 
navigational skills’.142 As noted in the Council of Europe’s White Paper, ‘[t]he competences 
necessary for intercultural dialogue are not automatically acquired: they need to be learned, 
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practised and maintained throughout life’.143  These skills allow respectful and appropriate 
interactions between individuals of different cultural backgrounds.144 Intercultural education 
is central to intercultural competence and includes formal, informal and non-formal 
education.145  
The acknowledgment that intercultural education is ‘a cornerstone in the creation of a 
cohesive society’,146 results in a strong convergence between article 6(1) FCNM and the 
cohesion strand of interculturalism. Lack of knowledge of ‘the other’ has been linked by the 
AC-FCNM to discrimination and the denial of rights.147 This has the potential to undermine 
the intercultural competence of all groups in society. Consequently, the AC-FCNM has 
emphasized the importance that ‘all languages and cultures that exist in society are visibly 
and audibly present in the public domain, so that everybody is aware of the diverse character 
of society and recognizes himself or herself as an integral part of it’.148 Notably, both 
interculturalists and the AC-FCNM have recognized that States must redesign the education 
curriculum in order to ensure that a variety of cultures and perspectives are represented. 149 
Further, the AC-FCNM has identified the role of the media alongside national150 and local151 
public awareness campaigns in providing accurate and unbiased information about the 
cultural practices of minorities and diversity in general. 152  The AC-FCNM has also 
recommended that States adopt measures that ‘place a greater emphasis on the positive 
contribution that foreigner’s participation in society, including in the labour market, could 
make’.153 This approach aligns with the constructivist strand of interculturalism154 and 
demonstrates how the different strands of interculturalism are intertwined in practice.  
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 Interculturalists within both the cohesion and contractual strands have also submitted 
that the participation of all groups in the political structures of the State facilitates integration 
and societal cohesion.155 This allows all groups to negotiate space for their identity within the 
public sphere, in a manner that is compatible with societal cohesion and individual rights.156 
Similarly, the AC-FCNM has acknowledged ‘that a key element to build up a cohesive 
society is to ensure that all its components are listened to and can contribute to the society 
they live in’.157 Under both article 6(1) and 15 FCNM, the AC-FCNM has repeatedly called 
upon States to establish effective ‘participatory structures facilitating dialogue with the 
representatives of ethnic minority groups’. 158 Participation is particularly important in the 
context of public affairs that directly impact minorities, such as integration measures and 
policies. 159  Inadequate or ineffective mechanisms to facilitate the participation and 
consultation of minorities have the potential to lead to alienation.160 Both the AC-FCNM and 
interculturalists have, thus, identified that effective participation is a requirement of societal 
cohesion.   
 Finally, interculturalists and the AC-FCNM have emphasized that measures to 
facilitate intercultural exchange and competence are unlikely to be successful as long as 
significant barriers to integration and participation exist. In this respect, Barrett recognizes 
that ‘equipping citizens with intercultural competence needs to take place in conjunction with 
and alongside measures to tackle inequalities and structural disadvantages, taking action to 
counter discrimination and remedying educational disadvantages’. 161  Consequently, the State 
must adopt policies to combat disadvantage and inequality (the contractual strand), if 
intercultural exchange (the cohesion strand) is to be successful. This again highlights the 
interconnected nature of the different strands of interculturalism.  
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  Assimilationist policies,162 barriers to citizenship163 and exclusionary conceptions of 
national identity164 indicate that the majority does not respect the culture of the minority.165 
Respect is a prerequisite of societal cohesion and intercultural dialogue. 166  Similarly, 
intolerance, xenophobia and hate speech in the media167 and political sphere168 pose barriers 
to integration by contributing to ‘feelings of hostility and rejection’.169 A corollary of 
xenophobia and intolerance is increased opposition to minority practices, including the 
preservation of language170 and visible symbols of difference such as mosques and religious 
clothing.171 Thus, in the context of the persistent failure of the Danish authorities to grant 
planning permission for a purpose-built mosque in Copenhagen, the AC-FCNM recognized 
that this was ‘a matter that risks undermining intercultural dialogue with persons belonging to 
the Muslim faith’.172 While interculturalism does not concern itself with the preservation of 
culture, 173 Bouchard and Loobuyk have acknowledged that opposition to and interference 
with minority practices are often discriminatory174 and, therefore, pose barriers to societal 
cohesion.175 As consistently highlighted by the AC-FCNM, the conditions necessary for 
societal cohesion cannot easily be separated from measures to facilitate the preservation of 
minority identity.  
 Interculturalists and the AC-FCNM have also identified socio-economic disadvantage 
as a barrier to intercultural dialogue.176 Although they agree that measures must be taken to 
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combat socio-economic disadvantage, some measures identified by interculturalists have the 
potential to undermine the preservation of minority identities and, thus, may have an 
unanticipated assimilatory impact. For example, Barrett suggests that ‘[p]ublic authorities 
should ... promote ethnically mixed neighbourhoods’. 177  Neighbourhoods (unofficially) 
segregated on the basis of ethnicity have the potential to reduce minority access to high 
quality education, social services and employment opportunities. By facilitating the creation 
of diverse communities, ‘ethnically mixed neighbourhoods’ increase the opportunities for 
intercultural exchanges to take place. However, in practice, measures adopted to counteract 
segregation often blame minorities rather than ‘the so-called “white flight” phenomena’.178 
Instead of facilitating improved inter-ethnic exchanges, this practice has been recognized by 
the AC-FCNM to pose additional barriers to societal cohesion by fuelling ‘resentment among 
minority communities’.179 Further, minorities often settle in the same area in order to access 
places of worship, language provision and other cultural resources. Thus, the ‘ethnically 
mixed neighbourhoods’ advocated by Barrett have the potential to reduce access to cultural 
resources and, thereby, undermine the ability of minorities to preserve their distinct identity. 
In turn, this may result in their involuntary assimilation. In contrast, the AC-FCNM has 
sought to balance the requirements of societal cohesion under article 6(1) with the 
preservation of minority identity under article 5(1) FCNM.180  
 A similar division between interculturalists and the AC-FCNM arises in relation to 
the interculturalist requirement that persons belonging to minorities must learn the language 
of the majority in order to overcome socio-economic disadvantage 181  and facilitate 
intercultural dialogue. 182  Whilst the AC-FCNM accepts that it may be necessary for 
minorities to learn the language of the majority in order to facilitate integration, this should 
be complemented with mother tongue provision, in order to avoid involuntary assimilation.183 
Such provision is incompatible with Cantle’s vision of interculturalism which rejects State 
support for minority practices. This divergence between the AC-FCNM and Cantle's 
interculturalism highlights how measures of interculturalism can have an unanticipated 
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assimilatory impact. However, Barrett – within the cohesion strand – and Bouchard – within 
the contractual strand – both recognize the validity of reasonable accommodation, including 
mother tongue language provision. Accordingly, the approach of the AC-FCNM is only 
inconsistent with Cantle’s interculturalism.   
 The interpretation of article 6(1) FCNM by the AC-FCNM closely aligns with the 
requirements of societal cohesion identified by interculturalists. However, some of the good 
practices identified by interculturalists have the potential to lead to the involuntary 
assimilation of persons belonging to minorities if their specific vulnerabilities are not fully 
appreciated. The withdrawal of State support for minority practices, as advocated by Cantle, 
is particularly problematic in this respect. In practice, the AC-FCNM has sought to balance 
measures of interculturalism with measures to facilitate the preservation of minority 
identities. Consequently, the AC-FCNM has endorsed interculturalism but within a 
multiculturalist framework that reduces the potential for assimilationist interpretations. 
 
B. Pursuing Interculturalism Outside of a Multiculturalist Framework: The European 
Convention on Human Rights 
 
In its jurisprudence concerning the challenges posed by diverse societies, the ECtHR has 
repeatedly used and endorsed concepts that underpin interculturalism, including 
integration,184 ‘social cohesion’,185 ‘pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness’,186 ‘dialogue 
and a spirit of compromise’187 and ‘living together’.188 However, the ECHR does not contain 
minority specific standards and the ECtHR has consistently failed to recognize the 
vulnerability of minorities to rights violations. 189  In order to test the hypothesis that 
interculturalism risks being conflated with assimilation if adopted outside a minority rights 
(multicultural) framework, this section examines the adoption of interculturalist concepts in 
ECtHR cases concerning religious minorities. It reveals that the ECtHR has consistently 
accepted interpretations of these concepts that legitimize assimilationist policies. 
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(i) The manifestation of religion in State institutions 
 
From the perspective of interculturalism and the ECtHR, the management of diversity within 
and by State institutions is central to the achievement of societal cohesion.190 The ECtHR 
does not explicitly endorse ‘interculturalism’ in cases concerning the manifestation of 
religion in State institutions. However, the cases considered here were decided after the 
adoption of the Council of Europe’s 2008 White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue and the 
ECtHR clearly establishes its commitment to concepts central to the pursuit of intercultural 
dialogue in its decisions. Specifically, it consistently reiterates that ‘[p]luralism and 
democracy must also be based on dialogue and a spirit of compromise necessarily entailing 
various concessions on the part of individuals which are justified in order to maintain and 
promote the ideals and values of a democratic society’.191 Furthermore, in the educational 
context, the ECtHR has identified the importance of co-education, in order to facilitate 
integration and avoid ‘the emergence of parallel societies’.192 This mirrors the ‘parallel lives’ 
debate that emanated from ‘The Cantle Report’ into the 2001 riots in the North of England.193 
The ECtHR has considered the restriction of minority religious symbols in State 
institutions in France in a number of cases. 194 It has consistently found no violation of the 
applicants’ right to manifest religion on the basis that the restriction pursued the legitimate 
aim of upholding the constitutional principle of laïcité195 and was consistent with margin of 
appreciation afforded to States to regulate the relationship between the Church and State.196 
The ECtHR’s approach is underpinned by the acceptance that secularism is consistent with 
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the role of the State as the ‘neutral and impartial organiser of the exercise of various 
religions, faiths and beliefs’. 197  While this appears to be compatible with Cantle’s 
interculturalism, insofar as ‘no faith is privileged over another’, Cantle has drawn a 
distinction between ‘secular governance’, which he identifies as desirable and ‘secular 
society’ which ‘is no longer appropriate’.198 Similarly, Bouchard has expressed a preference 
for ‘inclusive secularity’.199 Consequently, secularism and interculturalism are compatible 
provided that secularism does not result in the elimination of diversity from the public sphere.  
 The restriction of individual religious freedom in order to protect and uphold laïcité 
falls with the contractual strand of interculturalism, which permits ad hoc precedence to be 
granted to the ‘foundational culture’. However, as noted by Levey, there are three levels of 
ad hoc precedence: civilizational, historical-institutional and policy.200 These forms of ad hoc 
precedence should not be prioritised to the same degree. While the civilizational foundations 
of the State, for example language and calendar, are non-negotiable, the historical-
institutional foundations, such as the adopted model of Church-State relations, tend to be 
inflexible but can be subject to reform. 201 Bouchard has, specifically, argued that ‘sometimes 
the state can bestow some privilege to the majority culture when it is closely associated with 
the formation or the preservation of the symbolic foundation’.202 In contrast, policy decisions 
are flexible and, therefore, open to abuse.203 As a result, from an interculturalist perspective, 
civilizational and historical-institutional precedence is more legitimate than precedence at the 
policy level.204 In order to identify whether the ECtHR’s jurisprudence in cases concerning 
the restriction of religious symbols in State institutions is compatible with the contractual 
strand of interculturalism, the type of precedence invoked in these cases must be identified.  
  Laïcité has been central to French democracy since 1905, 205  and regulates the 
relationship between Church and State and, thus, appears to be a historical-institution and 
‘part of the symbolic foundation’. Notably, in Dogru v France, the ECtHR recognized that 
‘secularism is a constitutional principle, and a founding principle of the Republic, to which 
the entire population adheres and the protection of which appears to be of prime importance, 
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in particular in schools’.206 On this basis, it would appear that the margin of appreciation 
allowed to France by the ECtHR in order to protect laïcité aligns closely with the concept of 
historical-institutional ad hoc precedence. and, therefore, is consistent with the pursuit of 
interculturalism. 
 However, the understanding of laïcité as a static foundational principle of the State 
should not be uncritically accepted. Following l’affaire du foulard in 1989, it became clear 
that laïcité was subject to multiple and competing interpretations. One such interpretation, le 
droit à la différence, sought to ‘allow the coexistence of different cultural groups’,207 and did 
not require restrictions to be placed on the manifestation of religion in State institutions. This 
approach clearly aligns with Bouchard’s ‘inclusive secularity’,208 and Cantle’s ‘secular 
governance’.209 However, le droit à la différence was rejected and the interpretation of laïcité 
subsequently adopted in France has actively sought to justify the pursuit of social 
homogeneity through the elimination of religious difference from the public sphere.210 Akan 
has argued that Loi no 2004-228, which prohibits the wearing of ostentatious religious 
symbols in State schools,211 marked a shift from ‘“inclusionary laïcité” to “exclusionary 
laïcité”’.212 Instead of ‘the pluralist transformation of public space, institutions and civic 
culture’ required by interculturalism,213 laïcité has been redefined in France to justify the 
adoption of policies which exclude religious pluralism from the public sphere. This is prima 
facie incompatible with interculturalism. 
 The evolution of the concept of laïcité also suggests that it is not the static 
foundational principle accepted by the ECtHR. Consequently, restrictions on human rights 
justified by reference to the protection of laïcité are policy decisions. Precedence in the 
policy field is more likely to be abused than civilizational or historical-institutional 
precedence.214 Zapata-Barrero explains that ‘[t]he new members of a society, arriving by way 
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of immigration, sometimes challenge the actions and routine patterns of public conduct of 
tradition; they can, therefore, be perceived as potential threats to tradition’.215 In reaction to a 
perceived threat the majority’s identity may harden or be portrayed as non-negotiable.216 This 
appears to underpin the shift towards an assimilationist interpretation of laïcité following 
l’affaire du foulard. Indeed, Chadwick suggests that this development was motivated by the 
majority’s unwillingness to ‘openly grant laïcitié’s guarantee of religious freedom to 
Islam’.217  
 The redefinition of laïcité by the majority to exclude certain groups from equal 
constitutional protection constitutes an abuse of the dominant position and cannot be 
defended by reference to the pursuit of interculturalism. Notably, both Bouchard and Levey 
identify prohibitions on the wearing of religious symbols as a clear example of the abusive 
extension of ad hoc precedence.218 While the margin of appreciation appears to operate 
similarly to the concept of ad hoc precedence, the discretion permitted to the State to restrict 
the manifestation of minority religions by the ECtHR far exceeds that recognized to be 
legitimate within the contractual strand of interculturalism. The ECtHR’s jurisprudence 
demonstrates how ad hoc precedence can be misappropriated to justify assimilationist 
policies that restrict the rights of persons belonging to minorities.  
 It is perhaps unrealistic to expect the ECtHR to engage in a detailed evaluation of the 
evolution of laïcité in France. Nonetheless, the ECtHR can be expected to scrutinize the 
extent to which limitations on Convention rights pursue their purported aims. In the cases 
concerning the manifestation of religion in State institutions, the ECtHR has accepted that the 
restriction of article 9 ECHR pursues societal cohesion by reiterating in its decisions that 
‘[p]luralism and democracy must also be based on dialogue and a spirit of compromise 
necessarily entailing various concessions on the part of individuals’.219  Consequently, it is 
also valuable to consider whether the ECtHR’s jurisprudence aligns with an interculturalist 
understanding of the requirements of societal cohesion. 
The creation of mutual respect and understanding has been recognized by both the 
AC-FCNM220 and interculturalists221 to be a prerequisite of intercultural dialogue. Thus, the 
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interculturalist approach to diversity requires mutual adaptation and ‘the construction of a 
national memory that reflects the diversity of the whole society’. 222 Yet, the exclusionary 
interpretation of laïcité prevents persons belonging to religious minorities from influencing 
the national story.223 As recognized by the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly 
(PACE), ‘such decisions may give rise to the feeling among members of the communities 
concerned that they are not considered full members of the national community’.224 Despite 
the ECtHR’s reference to concepts closely aligned with interculturalism, the elimination of 
minority symbols from the public sphere in the examined cases is likely to create barriers to 
societal cohesion by establishing the assimilation of minorities into the way of life of the 
majority as a requirement of societal membership. 
It is particularly significant that both States and the ECtHR have diminished the lived 
experiences of religious minorities in order to justify restrictions on religious practices. 
Specifically, in Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v Switzerland, the applicants argued that the 
compulsory participation of their daughters in swimming classes within the State education 
system violated article 9 ECHR. The ECtHR accepted the legitimacy of the interference on 
the basis that it pursued ‘integration’ and ‘successful socialisation’ and that the State had 
sought to accommodate the applicants’ religious convictions by allowing their daughters to 
wear the burkini.225 The pursuit of integration through enforced ‘simultaneous, homogenous 
activity’ on basis of the majority’s conception of the good life is itself problematic.226  
Specifically, from the perspective of interculturalism, it overlooks unequal power-relations 
and the counterproductive nature of placing coercive preconditions on societal 
membership.227 However, perhaps more significantly, the ECtHR rejected the applicants’ 
assertion that the burkini would have a ‘stigmatizing effect’, on the basis of a lack of 
evidence.228 Thus, it ignored the controversy surrounding the burkini that had unfolded in 
France the previous summer.229 The State, in this case, sought to facilitate interactions 
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between different groups in society. However, both the State and the ECtHR disregarded the 
experience of persons belonging to minorities, an approach has the potential to alienate and, 
thus, undermine rather than facilitate societal cohesion.  
 Furthermore, socio-economic disadvantage, particularly in the fields of employment 
and education, 230  is recognized to pose barriers to intercultural dialogue and societal 
cohesion. 231 In cases concerning State schools, the ECtHR has accepted that the exclusion of 
the applicants from mainstream education is proportionate to the aim pursued.232 Moreover, 
in Ebrahimian, the ECtHR accepted that it is legitimate to limit the manifestation of religion 
by individuals in public sector employment.233 In practice, this excludes hijab wearing 
Muslim women, and other religious minorities, from 21 percent of employment opportunities 
in France.234 Rather than facilitating societal cohesion, the accepted measures are likely to be 
counterproductive, as they increase socio-economic disadvantage by reducing access to 
education and employment. 
Interculturalists and the AC-FCNM have, further, recognized that socio-economic 
disadvantage increases segregation and leads to the ‘parallel existence’ phenomenon.235 The 
exclusion of visible signs of diversity from mainstream education and a significant proportion 
of the workforce has the potential to exacerbate such segregation. Rather than pursuing 
‘secular governance’, these measures seek to create a ‘secular society’, which is problematic 
from the perspective of Cantle’s interculturalism.236  Specifically, it reduces the opportunities 
for all groups to adapt to the realities of living in a plural society and gain intercultural 
competence.237 The exclusion of religious symbols from State institutions has the potential to 
increase barriers to intercultural dialogue and undermine societal cohesion, rather than create 
the conditions necessary for intercultural dialogue to take place.  
 On a superficial level, the approach of the ECtHR in cases concerning the 
manifestation of religion in State institutions appears to align with interculturalism. The 
margin of appreciation is comparable to historical-institutional ad hoc precedence and the 
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ECtHR accepts that these policies pursue societal cohesion. However, policies that seek to 
eliminate diversity from the public sphere directly undermine interculturalism, especially 
when motivated by the majority’s unease with difference. These cases demonstrate how 
easily States can appropriate interculturalist concepts in order to legitimize assimilationist 
policies. The approach adopted by the ECtHR, in particular, the deference to the State 
through the wide margin of appreciation, fails to recognize the vulnerability of minorities to 
human rights violations.  
 
(ii) ‘Living together’ and the ‘ban on face coverings’ 
 
The ECtHR directly adopted the language of interculturalism in the case of SAS v France and 
the analogous cases of Belcacemi and Oussar v Belgium and Dakir v Belgium.238 In SAS v 
France, the ECtHR accepted that the concept of ‘vivre ensemble’ or ‘living together’ justified 
Loi no 2010–1192 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public (the ‘ban on 
face coverings’), which restricted the applicant’s right to manifest her religion by wearing the 
burqa. 239  Intercultural dialogue and the associated concept of ‘living together’ was 
introduced into the Council of Europe through the Committee of Ministers’ ‘White Paper on 
Intercultural Dialogue: Living Together as Equals in Dignity’240 and the link between 
‘intercultural dialogue’ and ‘living together’ has been confirmed by PACE.241  
 The interpretation of ‘living together’ accepted in SAS v France, ‘respect for the 
minimum set of values of an open and democratic society’, 242 aligns with interculturalism 
insofar as human rights, democracy and the rule of law are recognized to ‘determine the 
limits of the respect accorded to cultural practices’.243 Trispiotis suggests that ‘[b]oth the 
majority of the ECtHR in S.A.S. and Resolution 2076 of the Council of Europe employ 
“living together” as a portmanteau concept covering various different principles, including 
solidarity, fraternity, civility and mutual respect’.244 Moreover, France indicated that the 
intention of the law was to remove barriers to intercultural dialogue; ‘it was a question of 
responding to a practice that the State deemed incompatible, in French society, with the 
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ground rules of social communication’.245 These interpretations of ‘living together’ appear to 
correspond with the cohesion strand of interculturalism. However, the term vivre ensemble 
had previously been employed in France to justify restrictions on the wearing of religious 
symbols in State schools and, consequently, has an implicit assimilationist connotation at a 
domestic level.246  
 The adoption of a law in order to mediate differences between the majority and 
minorities again falls with the contractual strand of interculturalism. Bouchard has suggested 
that it is possible to justify restrictions on the burqa on the basis of ad hoc precedence, if they 
pursue the legitimate objectives of gender equality,247 or ‘security or other compelling 
reasons’.248 Both of these arguments were adopted by the French government in SAS v 
France and are legitimate grounds of limitation under article 9(2) ECHR. However, the 
ECtHR did not agree that the ‘ban on face coverings’ pursued the aim of ‘gender equality’,249 
whereas in relation to ‘public order’ it found that that blanket nature of the ban was 
disproportionate to the aim pursued.250 Similarly, while Bouchard has accepted that some 
restrictions on the burqa can be justified within the contractual strand of interculturalism, he 
has also argued that blanket bans are too far-reaching and, therefore, constitute an abuse of 
the dominant position.251 Thus, the two legitimate arguments from the perspective of the 
contractual strand failed in SAS v France.  
 However, the French government successfully invoked ‘living together’ as a 
justification for limiting the applicant’s rights under the ground of ‘the rights and freedoms of 
others’. Consequently, the ECtHR accepted that the ‘ban on face coverings’ pursued the 
cohesion strand of interculturalism. The legitimacy of invoking the cohesion strand of 
interculturalism in order to justify the restriction of the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities warrants further exploration. As previously noted, interculturalism risks being 
conflated with assimilation when the inherent bias of liberal States in favour of the 
preferences of the majority is not recognized. Consequently, the French ‘ban on face 
coverings’ has the potential to result in the alienation of minority communities rather than 
societal cohesion. 
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In SAS v France, the ECtHR accepted that ‘in view of the flexibility of the notion of 
“living together” and the resulting risk of abuse, the Court must engage in a careful 
examination of the necessity of the impugned limitation’.252 This approach appears to align 
with interculturalism, insofar as it recognizes the need for ad hoc precedence to be balanced 
with the human rights of minorities. Yet, the ECtHR also accepted that it had ‘a duty to 
exercise a degree of restraint’ on the basis of the democratic origins of the ‘ban on face 
coverings’.253 Thus, the ECtHR accepted that France had a wide margin of appreciation in 
relation to ‘living together’.254 It is not possible for the ECtHR to simultaneously ‘engage in a 
careful examination’ and ‘exercise a degree a restraint’. The lack of scrutiny associated with 
the margin of appreciation has the potential to undermine any attempt to identify the ‘abuse 
of the dominant position’. This is particularly apparent in relation to the ‘ground rules of 
social communication’ accepted by the ECtHR as sufficient to justify the restriction of the 
applicant’s rights.  
The French government indicated that it was motivated by the wish to reduce barriers 
to dialogue and exchanges between members of the majority and minorities,255 which appears 
to align with the cohesion strand of interculturalism. However, Barrett warns that ‘any 
dialogue is inevitably affected by status differentials and power relations between the 
participants within the dialogue and so it rarely takes place on a level playing field’.256  It is 
clear that in SAS v France the identified ‘ground rules of social communication’ were based 
on the preferences of the majority. Specifically, Trotter argues that ‘the Court ... took on the 
conceptualisation of “the” community that underpinned the French principle of “living 
together” here: a community pre-established and maintained on its own terms’.257 Loi no 
2010–119 is framed in a neutral manner. However, the debate surrounding its adoption 
indicates that it was specifically intended to prohibit the wearing of the burqa and niqab258 
and a number of majority practices are excluded from the scope of the law.259 Nonetheless, in 
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its decision, the ECtHR accepted the neutrality of the law260 and did not recognize that power 
differentials had allowed the preferences of the majority to legitimize indirect discrimination 
against persons belonging to minorities.261  
 Interculturalism requires ‘a search for balance and mediation between often-
competing principles, values and expectations’. 262 However, the coercive nature of the 
law,263 the exemption of majority practices from its scope alongside the identified power 
differentials evidences that the ‘ban on face coverings’ was not the ‘search for balance’ 
required by both the contractual and cohesion strands of interculturalism. Rather than 
pursuing ‘living together’ through mutual adaptation, ‘the ban on face coverings’ sought to 
eliminate visible symbols of diversity, which were a source of discomfort for the majority. 
This was acknowledged in the partially dissenting judgment in SAS, 
 
... the blanket ban could be interpreted as a sign of selective pluralism and 
restricted tolerance … It has not sought to ensure tolerance between the vast 
majority and the small minority, but had prohibited what is seen as a cause of 
tension.264  
 
This not only constitutes an abuse of the dominant position, but also has the potential to 
undermine intercultural dialogue by alienating members of the minority. Indeed, the majority 
in the ECtHR recognized that the law had ‘upset part of the Muslim community’265 and had 
the potential to lead ‘to the consolidation of the stereotypes which affect certain categories of 
the population and of encouraging the expression of intolerance’.266 This is directly at odds 
with the aims of intercultural dialogue and the cohesion strand, which seek to facilitate 
societal cohesion by challenging stereotypes in order to reduce ‘the fear of “others”’.267 Yet, 
the ECtHR was unwilling to challenge the interpretation of ‘living together’ adopted by the 
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French government, on the basis that it had been adopted following a democratic process.268 
This, again, fails to recognize the potential for the abuse of the dominant position.   
 Finally, the impact of Loi no 2010–1192 on women who choose to wear the burqa  
also dispels the suggestion that it sought to facilitate intercultural interactions. Rather than 
encouraging women who wear the burqa to participate in social communication, it has been 
reported that following the adoption of Loi no 2010–1192, they have avoided ‘going out’.269 
This danger was acknowledged by the ECtHR, which noted that ‘the ban may have the effect 
of isolating them and restricting their autonomy’.270 This directly undermines the law’s 
purported aims.271  Instead of enabling the majority and minorities to gain intercultural 
competence through everyday interactions, the ‘ban on face coverings’ has, in practice, 
reduced the opportunities for intercultural dialogue to take place. 
 In SAS, the ECtHR accepted an understanding of ‘living together’ that permitted the 
unease of the majority with the visible presence of difference to take priority over the 
Convention rights of minorities, even though it recognized that the law, in practice, posed 
significant barriers to intercultural dialogue and societal cohesion. If the purpose of 
interculturalism is to encourage societal cohesion, the majority cannot be permitted to restrict 
the rights of minorities without good reason. That good reason cannot be interculturalism 
itself. Otherwise, ‘living together’ allows the majority to set the terms of societal membership 
and does not recognize the need for mutual adaptation. By prioritizing the preferences of the 
majority above the concrete rights of the minority, ‘the ban on face coverings’ constitutes an 
abuse of the dominant position and demonstrates how easily Bouchard’s ad hoc precedence 
can be misappropriated to support assimilationist policies.  
 
(iii) The ECtHR: Conflating interculturalism and assimilation? 
 
From an interculturalist perspective, the restrictions placed on the manifestation of religion in 
the examined ECtHR cases constitute an abuse of the dominant position and are more likely 
to undermine than facilitate societal cohesion. Yet, these cases also reveal that the language 
of interculturalism can be (mis)appropriated and interpreted to support measures of 
assimilation. As warned by critics, interculturalism ‘easily slides in practice towards 
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imposing assimilation as a condition of integration’.272 As France openly pursues assimilation 
as a method of diversity management,273 the adoption of assimilationist policies is to be 
anticipated. However, the ECtHR has been unwilling to engage with the requirements of 
societal cohesion and question the validity of assimilationist ‘integration policies’. In SAS v 
France, the ECtHR deferred to the democratic process,274 and, thus, did not engage with the 
vulnerability of minorities to human rights abuses.  
Both the ‘ban on face coverings’ and the restrictions placed on the manifestation of 
religion in State institutions have the potential to reduce the intercultural competence of 
members of French society. By eliminating diversity from the public sphere, these measures 
do not insist upon the adaptation of the majority to the presence of diversity within society. 
Consequently, the majority’s resistance to visible symbols of difference in the public sphere 
is likely to increase in the future. This is evidenced by the extension of the ban on religious 
symbols from schools to public institutions275 and the workplace, more generally, 276 the 
recent move to ban the burkini on public beaches277 and the expulsion of Muslim girls from 
schools for wearing long skirts.278 Such measures exclude the targeted communities from 
societal membership and, thus, have the potential to undermine societal cohesion by 




Interculturalism has been presented as a panacea for the alleged failings of multiculturalism. 
Consequently, the terms interculturalism, living together, intercultural dialogue, integration 
and social cohesion have replaced the language of multiculturalism in Europe. This article 
has demonstrated that there is much common ground between interculturalism and the 
international human rights regime. Both recognize the value of diversity and the fluid nature 
                                                
272  Taylor, supra n 9 at 420. Kymlicka, supra n 2 at 214. 
273  Article 21-24 du Code civil. En revanche, l’assimilation est une condition de la naturalisation.  
274  SAS, supra n 5 at para 154. 
275  Ebrahimian, supra n 194. 
276  Baby Loup case Cass Ass Plén 25 June 2014, (2014) Rec D 1386; Case C-157/15 Request for a preliminary 
ruling from the Hof van Cassatie (Belgium) lodged on 3 April 2015 — Samira Achbita, Centrum voor 
gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v G4S Secure Solutions NV (2015) 58 Official Journal of 
the European Union C 205/24 at 17-18; Case C-188/15 Asma Bougnaoui, Association de défense des droits 
de l’homme (ADDH) v Micropole Univers SA (2015) 88 Official Journal of the European Union C 221/03 at 
2-3. 
277  Mulholland, supra n 229. 
278  BBC News, ‘France Outcry over Muslim Schoolgirl’s Skirt Ban’, 29 April 2015, available at: 




of culture, reject assimilation and accept that it is legitimate for States to seek to integrate 
diverse societies. However, two key elements of interculturalism – ad hoc precedence and the 
removal of State support for minority practices – have the potential to legitimize measures of 
assimilation, contrary to international human rights law.  
 The dangers associated with the (mis)appropriation of the language of 
interculturalism have been realized in the ECtHR, a body that does not have a minority rights 
mandate. The approach adopted by the ECtHR not only legitimises interference with the 
human rights of persons belonging to minorities but also has the potential to undermine 
societal cohesion by alienating minorities and reducing the intercultural competence of all 
members of society. In contrast, the AC-FCNM has adopted an approach that is largely 
consistent with interculturalism but has sought to balance societal cohesion with the 
preservation of minority identity. This has prevented interculturalist concepts from taking on 
assimilationist interpretations. It is striking that while that AC-FCNM has stressed the 
importance that ‘all languages and cultures that exist in society are visibly and audibly 
present in the public domain’,279 the ECtHR has accepted measures that eliminate diversity 
from the public sphere. To some extent the divergence between the AC-FCNM and ECtHR 
can be attributed to the different mandates of the two bodies. Nonetheless, the preceding 
analysis highlights that if the language of interculturalism is to avoid being (mis)appropriated 
to legitimise assimilationist policies, then both the inherent bias of the liberal State in favour 
of the majority culture and the vulnerability of minorities to human rights abuses must be 
recognized. Thus, if interculturalism is to be compatible with international human rights 
standards it must be adopted within a minority rights (multiculturalist) framework.  
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